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Stoic Emotion
Lawrence C. Becker

A successful rehabilitation of Stoic ethics will have to defeat the idea that
here is something deeply wrong, and perhaps even psychologically imt
'ble about the kind of emotional life that Stoics recommend. The
pOSSI
,
image of the austere, dispassionate, detached, tranquil, and virtually affectless sage - an image destined to be self-refuting - has become a staple
of anti-Stoic philosophy, literature, and popular culture. It has been constructed from incautious use of the ancient texts and is remarkably resistant to correction. Reminders that the ancient Stoics insisted that there
are good emotions are typically brushed aside by asserting that the ancient catalog of such emotions is peculiar; 1 that the emotions in even that
peculiar catalog are not accorded much significance by Stoics; and that
the ruthless emotional therapy practiced by Epictetus is a reliable guide
to the sort of emotional life Stoics want all of us to cultivate - namely, a
life of desiccated affect and discard able attachments.
Both Stoics and anti-Stoics alike have developed an unwholesome fascination with a picture ofthe Stoic sage drawn for extreme circumstances.
We persist, in high art and low journalism, in telling and retelling stories
of good people who resolutely endure horrors - injustice, torture, disease, disability, and suffering. Those of us who are attracted to Stoicism
This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Second Leroy E. Loemker Conference,
"Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations," 31 March-2 April 2000, at Emory University.
I am grateful to the participants at the conference for their helpful discussion. Special acknowledgment goes to Tony Long, Brad Inwood, and Richard Sorabji. A much earlier version of the paper was presented ata Stoicism conference at the University of London. in May
1999. I am grateful to the justifiably more skeptical audience at that occasion, and particularly to my commentator, Anthony Price, as well as to Richard Sorabji and Gisela Striker.
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often find such stories inspiring, and even anti-Stoics give them grudging
admiration. 2 But our fascination with them can be seriously misleading.
It can cause us to treat the emotional remoteness and austerity exhibited
by their heroes as central to the Stoic theory of good emotion, as opposed
to something central merely to its traditional therapies for people in
extremis. This is a mistake.
Rather, as I argue here, Stoic ethical theory entails only that we make our
emotions appropriate, by making sure that the beliefs implicit in them
are true, and by making them good for, or at least consistent with, the
development and exercise of virtue - that is, with the perfection of the
activity of rational agency. At this very abstract level, a Stoic theory of
emotion is similar to an Aristotelian one. But we should not be misled
by this high-altitude similarity. Stoic theories of value and virtue are very
different from their Aristotelian counterparts, so it will turn out that what
counts as an appropriate Stoic emotion in a given case is often strikingly
different from what counts as an appropriate Aristotelian one. But the
central, high-altitude theoretical point is nonetheless important. Robust
psychological heal th of the sort necessary for appropriate rational activity
is a constitutive element of virtuoso rational agency - a constitutive element of Stoic virtue. It thus follows that, insofar as emotion is a necessary
element of this aspect of psychological health, it is necessary for virtue.
It may be true that some ancient Stoics (notably Chrysippus) underestimated the extent to which emotion was a necessary component of
psychological health and thus of virtue. But that is a matter of getting the
facts straight, and surely all Stoics are committed to getting an adequate,
accurate psychology as a basis for their normative account of good emotion. The things that Chrysippus said about the heart being the scat of
consciousness _ things ridiculed centuries later by Galen 3 - are surely errors that Chrysippus himself would have wanted corrected. Not ridiculed,
but corrected. And if such errors informed his normative judgment~,
surely he would not only have corrected his errors about physiology but
also have made the necessary adjustments in his normative views.
The obvious way to develop a contemporary version of Stoicism with respect to the emotions is therefore to fasten on what the theory requires that is, on the conceptual relation between virtue and emotion in human
beings - and on what the best contemporary psychology says about how
such matters work out in practice. That is what I will do here, first by looking at some relevant features of empirical psychology, then by considering
the value of emotions in human life, and finally by examining the nature
of sagelike tranquillity and Stoic love.

L
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THE NATURE OF EMOTION

Psychologists who study emotion have not yet developed a standard line of
analysis of their subject, or even a standard nomenclature. I do not mean
to suggest that the literature is chaotic; far from it. But it is difficult to
summarize, because it is difficult to line up the accounts given by various
writers. Much depends on the level of analysis - whether one is speaking
of the neurophysiological substrate of emotion (Le., the activity of certain
discrete anatomical structures in the brain stem and limbic brain),4 the
more generalized physiology of emotional arousal (e.g., changes in blood
chemistry and blood flow, pupillary dilation, galvanic skin response, muscle tension),5 the interaction between these physiological states and cognitive responses to them,6 or the phenomenology of emotional states
as reported by human subjects during the treatment of their emotional
disorders. 7 In order to stay in contact with both Stoic theory and the full
range of contemporary psychological accounts, it seems wisest here to
situate the discussion first within what might be called commonsense
phenomenology and then to pay special attention to both the cognitive
content and the physiology of the states that we ordinarily describe and
experience as emotional ones.
Complexity: Affect, Sensation, Cognition, and Conation
As we commonly use the term, emotions have analytically distinct components, which mayor may not be distinct phenomenologically. Unless
we are simply going to construct a technical definition, then (e.g., by
insisting, implausibly, that various emotions are identical to various constellations of beliefs, or gross somatic changes, or neurophysiological
processes), we shall have to recognize the ways in which at least four
elements configure emotional experience - elements we may call affect,
sensation, cognition, and conation. To see this, consider the following
bit of commonsense phenomenology.
There is a difference between emotional and nonemotional belief. For
example, I can hold the beliefs ordinarily implicated in a given emotion
without "feeling" one way or the other about the state of affairs those
beliefs represent - that is, without being in a state we would ordinarily identifY as emotional. I can believe that I am in mortal danger, for
instance, and that things are going to turn out very badly for me, with
no countervailing good results for anyone, and still have a "flat affect"
about it. (Affect is difficult to define, but it may be enough for present
purposes to think of it as varying levels of attention, alertness, readiness,
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energized arousal, pro, con, or mixed valuational attitudes, and perhaps
a second-level awareness of that awareness.) This point about flat affect
seems true no matter how specific and value-laden one makes the beliefs:
in each case the believer mayor may not be in a significant affective state
with respect to what the beliefs represent. 8 So whether or not beliefs are
necessary elements of all emotion, they are never sufficient for it. Affect
is a necessary element also, and it may come close to being a sufficient
element at the extremes of mood and passion.
Further, some affective experience is coupled with an awareness of
somatic phenomena - flushed face, racing heart, sweating, tightness in
the throat, tears, tumescence, and so forth. We can get, and be aware
of, such sensations without having the beliefs and affect requisite for a
full-fledged emotion. Whiskey can produce a flushed face; slicing onions
can produce tears. Moreover, we can have intense emotional experience
without the awareness of such somatic changes. Think of a person who
lacks sensation from the chin down, and thus literally cannot feel the hair
on the back of his neck stand up when it does, or his nipples go erect
when they do. So having the physical sensations characteristic of various
emotions is neither necessary nor sufficient for having the emotions. That
is why attempts to study emotion by studying facial expression, galvanic
skin response, vegal tone, pupillary dilation, and so forth seem indirect
at best.
Finally, we may make a similar point about conation - understood
as the orientation or urge to act that is often characteristic of emotion.
The point is that conation does not always track emotion. One may be
"paralyzed" by fear as well as set in motion by it. Diminished conation is as
characteristic of some emotional states (ranging from blissful tranquillity
to depression) as heightened conation is characteristic of some others.
It thus seems best to treat full-fledged emotion in adult human beings
as a complex phenomenon: affect, laden with beliefs, and sometimes
laden with sensation or conation. In part because we want to assess Stoic
claims about the way beliefs control emotion, it seems best to think of
emotions as special sorts of affective states rather than special sorts of
belief states. 9
Moods, Feelings, Emotions, and Passions
Now suppose we distinguish four sorts of affective states, again considering them at first only in a commonsense, phenomenological way. Let us
call them moods, feelings, emotions, and passions. Although they differ
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along several dimensions, we can for convenience imagine them as arranged along a line that forms a nearly closed circle, beginning and ending with more or less "pure" affect. At one end are "moods" or affective
"tones" of various types (fleeting or prolonged, volatile or stable, discrete
or diffuse, mild or intense), which begin at a point just discernibly different from no affect at all - a point at which, for example, a subject will
report that consciousness is simply tinted or tinged with affect that does
not seem to have a causal connection to either cognition or action, or
to be related to any special physical sensation or somatic phenomena, or
to be focused on anything in particular. Nonetheless, even the mildest,
most fleeting moods can often be described in terms of quite complex
subjective experience (anxious, secure, erotic, energized, serene, etc.),
and neurological substrates for many of them can be identified and manipulated with drugs. Passions are at the other end of the line, ending
in an extreme at which affect virtually obliterates cognition and agencyan extreme in which, for example, people are so overwhelmed with what
began as anxiety or rage or fear or lust that they are "out of their minds,"
or "don't know the time of day," and, if they can make reports at all, can
report only a one-dimensional, feroci~usly focused affect. Passions can
be much milder than this, of course, but we will use the term to apply to
affect that is focused enough and strong enough to interrupt (as opposed
to color, focus, direct, or otherwise shape) deliberation and choice.
Between these extremes lie feelings and emotions. Feelings, we will
"'say, are distinct from moods. primarily by virtue of the subject's awareness
of various sorts of physical sensations and somatic phenomena associated with the affect, as we!fas some causal implications for cognition and
action - awareness that focus~s and thus intensifies the affective experience, making it seem localized and often giving it an object. (Full-fledged
sexual arousal is a feeling in this sense, whereas low-level erotic affect is
a mood.) And let us then say that emotions are distinct from other affects primarily by virtue of the subject's awareness and appraisal of the
cognitive components of an affect - the beliefs about the world that are
implicated in the affect, awareness that complicates and further focuses,
reinforces, or intensifies the feelings. Worry is an example; so is objectspecific, manageable fear.
Contemporary Psychology and Stoic Theory
There is a fairly impressive convergence between Stoic positions and contemporary psychology - even psychotherapylO - on the general nature
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of moods, feelings, emotions, and passions. As far as I can tell, empirical psychology has so far settled one dispute within ancient Stoicism,
has strengthened a few philosophical criticisms of the ancient Stoic account, has raised new problems about the unity of rational agency, but
has also confirmed much of the ancient Stoic doctrine on these matters.
Contemporary Stoics will have to make some adjustments to the ancient
doctrines, but nothing, I think, that will undermine their claim to being
Stoics.
The Persistence of Affective Impulse. The ancient dispute that modern psychology seems to have settled is one between Chrysippus and posidonius,
as reported by Galen." If it is true that Chrysippus believed Stoic moral
training could effectively remove excessive emotions at their source, by
removing the erroneous beliefs involved in them, and that this training could be so effective and so thorough that excessive emotion would
never arise in the sage, then Chrysippus was wrong. Instead, posidonius
had it right when he argued that primal affect was a permanent feature
of human life that sages, like the rest of us, would always have to cope
with.
The modern evidence for this comes from two sources: neurophysiology and pharmacology. Neurophysiologists have identified at least four
anatomically distinct structures in the "ancient" or subcortical portion of
the human brain that generate affective states - roughly fear, rage, panic,
and goal-oriented desire. 12 These structures are directly responsive to
both external stimuli and internal changes in brain chemistry prior to
significant cognitive processing. There is, for example, a naturally occurring hormone called cholecystokinin, which regulates secretions of. the
pancreas and gallbladder. When this hormone is introduced directly Illt~
the bloodstream (a natural, but not normal occurrence in human phySIology) it generates an anxiety response unconnected to any external ~r
internal threat.13 Similar stimulants exist for other affective structures III
the amygdala, and there are blocking agents as well _ pharmacological
agents that cause those affective structures to quiet down temporarily, to
cease generating affect. This does not mean that subsequent cognitive r~
sponses are ineffective in controlling such affect. It only means that thIS
sort of affective arousal and its immediate emotional or passional consequences cannot be eliminated by cognitive (Stoic) training, any more
than Stoic training can eliminate perspiration. Stoics with bad gallbladders will just have to cope with anxiety, whether they are sages or n~t;
similarly for people who have brain injuries, or brain tumors, that eXCIte
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affective structures. Modern medicine is clear that cognitive training is
not always the treatment of first choice for such affective disturbances.
I assume that none of this causes fundamental or general problems for
a Stoic account of the emotions, whatever it might mean for Chrysippus'
particular theses. Mter all, other things being equal, if potable water is
freely available to the thirsty sage, she will presumably drink it as a first
remedy (reminding herself of its status as a preferred indifferent) rather
than think away the thirst. So the fact that modern medicine sometimes
recommends drugs or surgery as a first remedy should not, for that reason alone, make it inconsistent with Stoic theory. Moreover, the affects
generated solely by subcortical structures in our brains correspond to the
sort of primal impulses or excitation so often discussed by Stoics as leading more or less involuntarily to proto-emotions (propatheiaz) , and thence
transformed by further cognitive processes into full-fledged emotions. 14
They thus fit comfortably into a contemporary Stoic account. The task
for the Stoic is to recognize the source of affective agitation and protoemotion, and to correct any false beliefs that may have arisen from it
along with the affect. Done effectively, in accord with a Stoic account of
the good, that process will eventually transform the prop~theiai into eupatheiai. If anything is a fundamental or general aspect of a Stoic account
of emotion, it is that. The reference to recognizing the etiology of the
proto-emotion is a later amendment, but not one that is troublesome.
More about that later.
Happily, there is settled agreement, in the modern psychology of emotion, that this fundamental aspect of the Stoic account is correct for a wide
range of quite mild to quite strong affective states that are characteristic
of psychological health. Leaving aside especially weak, strong, fleeting,
or enduring emotional states for the moment, it looks as though there
is no disagreement at all with even the ancient Stoic proposition that
full-fledged emotions are distinguished from one another primarily by
distinct (and constitutive) belief structures in the subject and are transformable by changes in the subject'S beliefs. 15 The modern psychological
amendment to this would simply be to insist that raw affect, generated
in distinct neurological structures and having distinct behavioral consequences, often precedes the cognitive content that turns it into fullfledged emotion.
The only thing that is troubling for Stoic theory in this amendment
is the reference to behavioral consequences. That reference is emblematic of the fact that modern empirical psychology is apparently much
more comfortable with a modular conception of human agency than
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Stoics would have expected it to be. In fact, it looks as though personality
psychologists from Freud onward have generally worked with something
more like a tripartite Platonic model of motivation and psychodynamics
than a unified Stoic one. I think there is less to this than meets the eye,
however.
The Stoic hypothesis is simply that rational agency in mature human
beings is unified in the sense that it is a conative power in which the direct determinant of action is always the same one sort of thing - belief. 16
The idea is that in mature, healthy human beings, pure affect, as long as
it does not initially overwhelm agency, is immediately subjected to cognitive appraisal and infused with cognitive content - beliefs that have
consequences for the affect itself as well as for its translation to action.
All affective states - or least all of those above the level of pure primal impulse - have at least implicit, controlling beliefs, and are ultimately subject
to the agent's ability to control those beliefs. Thus Stoic psychotherapy is
a form of cognitive therapy - an effort to focus on, and then to correct,
the cognitive errors that underwrite pathology. 17
It is clear that, in order to be consistent with modem psychology,
we would now have to modify these references to belief by replacing
them with references to cognitive states generally. Such states include
both active and dispositional beliefs, but also include perceptual filters, information-processing routines, and so forth, some of which may
be quite "modular" at the level of neurophysiology. The question is
whether, even with this modification, the Stoic hypothesis about the
unity and power of rational agency are consistent with modem empirical
psychology.
It appears to me that the motivational part is consistent, almost by
definition. If we distinguish between action and other sorts of behavior
by using the former term to mark out the class of intentional or goaldirected behaviors, then it clearly follows that whatever the original motivating source of an action might be, that motivation will always be filtered
through a cognitive state of some sort. And the evidence from psychology
clearly supports the proposition that the content of the cognitive state determines the nature (if not always the timing) of the consequent action. 18
So that seems consistent with traditional Stoic doctrine.
Nonetheless, it does seem clear that modem empirical psychology
would reject not only the idea that we can extirpate subcortical affective impulses but also the idea that rectifying our beliefs will always, ultimately, be effective in rectifying our affect. Modem Stoics will thus have
to be more cautious than their ancient brethren in making claims for
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. .
or iniu
. are mortal. And because StOICS
. a re matenalIsts,
OJ
ry. Th·
eIr b odles
.
we h
I
·
ave a ways acknowledged that our minds and emotions toO ' lIke
. . everything else about us, are physical entities subject to disease and IfiJury.
Ancient Stoics, confronted by the modern evidence, would surely have no
difficulty adjusting their ideas about the root physical causes and ~ppro
priate physical remedies for such affective neuropsychological dIseases
and i~uries, even for sages.
.
The necessity for such adjustment is an example of the way in WhI~~
modern empirical psychology strengthens some of the traditional cntI.
CISms
of the Stoic psychology of emotion. There are several 0 th ers, most
.
of ~hich have to do with the relation between psychological health (~hIch
StOICS recognize as a necessary condition for the development of VIrtue)
and the amount and variety of affect in one's life (which Stoics have perhaps traditionally underestimated). I deal with those matters in most of
what follows. But I want to conclude this section by noting that contemporary Stoics will have to pay somewhat closer attention to moods and
threshold affective states than the ancient texts do. Here is the problem.
The Etiology of Mfect: Nonreferential or Liminal States
On the standard Stoic account, one assesses the appropriateness of affect by assessing the truth of the beliefs implicit in it - beliefs about the
external events or states of affairs that elicit the affect, and beliefs about
what attitudes we should take toward those external matters, given their
value in Stoic terms. Appropriate emotion is necessarily emotion that is
in accord with nature, that is, in accord with true beliefs about events and
their value. The ancient Stoics were confident that cognition could drive
affect and that rectifying our beliefs about the world could rectifY our
emotions in this sense.
Nonreferential Affect. Moods pose a problem for this traditional account
for two reasons. One is that they often have peculiarly indeterminate
cognitive content - content that is incorrigibly true (and thus not in need
of correction) but that nonetheless can compromise rational agency in
the following way.
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I
"
Ow to cope with them," That is certainly true, as a genera
PropoSlt~on, And so, because this belief about the world is true, the stanard StOiC re
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the anXIety b I'
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- e lefs about whether it matters, ultimately, how suc t Illgs
turn out and h
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Ow It IS appropriate for us to feel an act.
'
, The problem is that such a response will misdirect our attention, We
wIll be f o c u s ' ,
I worry
lUg on the mappropriateness of some very genera
about the 0
'
t ny"
uter world, when the source of that general worry IS no a
thmg m the Outer World but rather a wholly internal feature of our body
chemistry
:
"
,
,0r teh
operation
of an unconscIOUS
emotIOn aI d'ISPOSI'tl'on ' In
senous cases we may make senous
"
h'i this
way
mistakes about our h eaIt
ll
,
~epeatedly qUieting the anxiety thrown up by a disease process by remin~
mg ourselves again and again of what is of ultimate importance, In tlllS
way we ultimately end in a misdirected Stoic version of praying without
ce~sing, because the process becomes an ever tightening circle - waves
of I~creasing anxiety followed by attempts at calm, followed by renewed
anxiety from internal causes that become increasingly inaccessible to us
as we focus ever more persistently on the value question, rather than on
the physiology or psychodynamic that is repeatedly eliciting the anxiety,
T,he obvious solution to this problem is to make sure that we pay attention to the question of etiology, Is our affect being elicited by external
e~ents or internal ones? Is the anxiety prompted by something in the e~
V1ronment that we cannot quite identifY? Or is it prompted by changes III
Our blood chemistry? In the case of emotions that have clear objects in the
external world - fear of things that go bump in the night, for example the standard Stoic analysis may indirectly suffice, Mter all, if we assess our
beliefs about night noises and find that they are false because we were
having auditory hallucinations, then when the fear persists we will presumably be led to think about internal causes for it, In the case of affect
that has no specific object, however, and prompts only general, incorrigibly true beliefs about the world, we cannot rely on the assessment of their
truth to lead us in the appropriate direction, So, especially in the case
of what we might call "nonreferential" affect, we have to add something
to the standard Stoic account, There are now three rather than two sorts
of beliefs we must assess: beliefs about the etiology of the alTect; beliefs
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about ta
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ponse to those
s tes of affairs; and beliefs about the appropnate res
states of affairs
. :
t but we should
I thO
s IS a slgmficant change in Stoic theory? Probably no ,
acknowledge that it makes the theory somewhat less tidy. We can no
1onger p 1ausibly assert that the cognitive content imp1·tel·t·n
the affect
1
itself is all we need to address in order start down the right pa~ towa~d
as
sItse
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.
d e t h e question of Its
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We will have to mclu
etiology as well.
Threshold Affect. There is a related problem about affect that hovers at
the threshold of our awareness of it. Such liminal states are problematic for therapy because subjects have difficulty identifying the. nature
of their affect (putting an illuminating name to it), or difficulty m even
identifying its existence as affect. There is no serious divergence between
Stoicism and modern psychology about one extreme of the emotional
.
· tenseso
contmuum
- namely the place where passions become so m
,
overwhelming, that they literally stop thought. Both agree that, ~t that
threshold, maintaining or restoring self-control requires a reductlOn of
the affect, and both agree that such self-control is necessary for health
and a good life.
But consider affect at the other extreme of intensity - moods or feelings, for example, that are difficult for subjects to perceive or name. ("You
are very angry today." -Angry? I am? _ "Yes. Just think about what you've
been doing.") Both Stoics and modern psychotherapists think that it is
important for subjects to identity such states properly - to know themselves better. And just as we often need help in understanding that we are
having difficulty seeing or hearing in threshold circumstances, we may
need help identitying our affect. One obvious method for dealing with
liminal auditory phenomena is to turn up the volume and keep it at a
fully audible level. Doing something similar with our very mild affective
states seems an obvious way of staying in cognitive contact with them.
Even though deliberately dialing up the intensity of an affect sounds like
a very un-Stoic thing to do,19 I suppose there can be no serious Stoic objection to it as long as the resulting emotional state does not disturb one's
tranquillity. It is hard to imagine, however, that this would not be disturbing, even for a sage, at the very least because it deliberately generates
something that we then have to cope with.
This is at least a small puzzle for Stoics. Some of what I have to say
here about the value of emotion and about the nature of tranquillity
may indirectly help address it, but I am not confident I have solved the
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THE GOOD OF EMOTION
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for think'
IVerge from common opinion, having endurmg reasons
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- OICS Imagine. As far as I can tell, nothmg m mo e
0 o~ (or modern philosophy for that matter) undercuts this aspect
'
o f th e tradition I '
a StOIC account of emotion.
Emotion as Natural
What good ar h
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.
e uman emotions? The answers one can get to t at quesh'
tIOn are frust .
.
ratlllgly circular. Ultimately, they amount to not mg more
than thiS' hu
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dr h
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man emotions, when they are good at all, are goo lor umans Simply b
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ecause humans are emotional creatures - creatures w 0
are so const't d
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xpenence, or flourish without a rich and vane emotIona
bfe, ~r deliberate effectively about ends without giving those ends an
emotional valence, or communicate adequately with each other without
sympa~y and emotional gestures, or form profound attachments to each
other Without empathy. But nothing in such answers suggests a transcendent value for emotions as such _ something that would, for example,
~ause us to think that nonhuman beings would necessarily be deficient
Ifthe.y lacked emotion; something that would underwrite the temptation
to thlOk that if any unfortunate, emotionless creatures were intelligent
enough to appreciate the difference between human lives and their own,
they would be like the wistful androids of science fiction, superhuman in
some respects but yearning to find love and laughter.
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it is true, of course, that humans are not the only creatures who
NOwf'C ct Many other forms of life on this planet, from reptiles to the
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s have neurological structures that are homologous to some
eat ape,
gr
s we have in subcortical areas of our brains - structures that are
tructure
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to generate, in humans, raw primal affect such as fear, rage, sepkno~ anxiety, and desire (where that includes everything from pure
ara~:ity to ferociously single-minded purposive behavior). 20 Moreover,
cun w that these subcortical structures operate initially, precognitively,
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uch the same way across all these species, and thus operate in hum m infants and very young children in much the same way as they do in
mane other species. But it is also clear that in adult human beings the firsom
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cally reshapes our pnma emoUona responses. Adult urn an emoUon is,
as the ancient Stoics insisted, inescapably cognitive in ways that we cannot
map onto the physiology of reptiles, the lower mammals, and even (in
large part) those primates with whom we are most closely related physiologically. Their affective experience, whatever it is li~e, is apparently not
much like adult human emotion. Consequently, the good of adult human
emotion, whatever it is, is inescapably tied to human nature - to what
constitutes (adult) human health, human flourishing, human deliberation, human communication, human relationships. And, of course, the
obverse is true as well: the evils of human emotion lie in what constitutes
ill health, failure to flourish, inability to deliberate effectively, inability to
communicate fully, inability to form profound human relationships. This
is circular, but instructive.
Emotion and Health
Consider health. 21 We are told, by the human sciences, that human infants literally wither - fail to thrive physically; fail to develop a healthy
physiology - if their primal emotions ("seeking," fear, anxiety, desire,
rage) are not appropriately responded to, where appropriate response
means enabling their purposive activity, alleviating their fear and anxiety, satisfying or diverting their desire and rage, and in general holding,
comforting, and caressing them. We are told that very young children develop pathological psychologies if they do not form healthy attachments
to those humans nearest to them, where a healthy attachment means one
characterized in part by reciprocal emotional interaction that creates a
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sense of security and possibility and enables learning and purposive activity. We are told that the way these early stages of our emotional lives go
has a profound effect on our basic temperaments (whether anxious, distrustful, and pessimistic, for example, or secure, trustful, and optimistic),
on the templates for human relationships we try to re-create and preserve throughout our whole lives (or perhaps cannot help but re-create
and preserve, despite our best efforts to avoid them), and on the narrative expectations we have for the way our various endeavors will go
(whether we think they will go well, for example, through our own efforts or only through magic; whether we think we deserve for them to
go well only if we are beautiful, or please others, or have won success
through struggle). We are told that these basic temperaments, templates,
and expectations have "default" epistemic consequences- that they shape
what we immediately perceive, and consequently what we initially believe
about the world, in ways that are resistant to rational reassessment. We
are told that these epistemic defaults, because they influence cognition
generally,22 influence the cognitive elements of mature human emotions
as well, setting up the conditions under which we will continue to strive,
or to give up; the conditions under which we will love or hate; the people
with whom we will form profound relationships; and the general nature
of those relationships, including how open, secure, and wholehearted,
for example, or guarded, anxious, and tentative. All of this has consequences for our health, both physical and psychological, throughout
our lives.
Emotion and a Good Life
Now consider eudaimonia- not just a healthy life but an abundantly good
one, a flourishing life. Again we get circular argument~, but instructive
ones. We say life without emotion (to the extent that is even possible, psychologically) would be unbearably bleak, dull, flat, boring, unmotivating,
inert, depressing, joyless. But that is, of course,just another way of saying
that emotion is good for emotional health; good emotion is emotionally
good. And if circular arguments with a radius that short were generally
available, philosophy would be remarkably easy.
Notice, though, what the circularity of this argument suggests: it suggests that adult human beings are so constituted that emotion is a necessary or basic good for us - something we must have in order to flourish
in any form accessible to us, or at least to our imaginations, and hence to
our choices as rational agents. If so, then if we want to flourish at all, we
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must follow our natures in this respect and get the affect we need. (Homo
sapiens to be sure, but also homo ludens.)
There are similar things to be said about communication, and social
and personal relationships among humans. Many people say (or, at least
since the rise of romanticism, have obsessively said) that we cannot fully
connect with other people without being able to read and respond to
their emotional frame of mind - the feeling, or lack of it, that informs
their actions, their choices, their dealings with us. We describe people
whom we cannot read in this way as remote, or inaccessible; sometimes
as arrogant, rude, or lacking in the emotional generosity needed to allow
us to respond fully to them. We say that profound personal relationships
are necessary to the best forms of life, are a constituent of the most
complete forms of human happiness, and that such relationships require
that people be emotionally accessible to each other. The fact that this sort
of talk is a peculiarly modern obsession, though of course not unknown
in antiquity, should not lessen our confidence in its truth. But again
we should be aware of a sort of circle in the implicit argument. The
truth is that we need emotion only to connect with, communicate with,
form profound relationships with emotional beings like ourselves. Being
emotionally generous with a sponge is pointless as far as we can tell.
Andjust as we sense, intuitively, in love relationships that the degree and
timing of emotional honesty and intimacy are delicate matters, so too
we sense that what counts as appropriate behavior in this regard varies
widely from one person to the next, and one situation to the next with
the same person. Some people are psychologically damaged in ways that
make emotional honesty or openness in others threatening - an obstacle
to their regaining their health rather than a necessity for it.
Deliberation about Ends
There is a line of thought about the necessity of emotion in human life
that goes roughly like this: means-end reasoning may be purely hypothetical or theoretical, aiming only at knowledge of causal relationships
between an action and a goal in cases where neither is valued positively,
or even thought to be permissible. That is to say, means-end reasoning
may take this form: if one were to go for X, what would be the necessary
(sufficient, the most efficient, best overall) means to take to get to that
end? To turn such theoretical reasoning into genuinely practical reasoning, into deliberation, one must actually have an end, a goal, a purpose.
Having a goal X is necessarily to value or prize X in a way that motivates
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one to go for X, and valuing or prizing something in that motivating way
necessarily has an affective dimension - one that we typically sum up in
the term desire. One may feel such desire as either a push from within (an
impulse) or a pull from without (an attraction). But in either case one
does feel this. 23 This is not to say that having an end is thoroughly or even
dominantly a noncognitive business. It is merely to say that having an end
is always partly a noncognitive business. It is to say that insofar as we lack
desire with respect to X, insofar as we feel no impulse or attraction to it
at all, X cannot be one of our ends. Thus, people who lack desire entirely
(if that is psychologically possible) lack ends entirely and are entirely unable to deliberate - entirely unable to engage in practical reasoning that
leads to decision, as opposed to mere theoretical reasoning about means
to hypothetical ends.
In the hands of philosophers and philosophically inclined literary folk,
this line of thought often appears to proceed in a priori terms, but this is
clearly a mistake. One may, after all, have a motivating categorical commitment to some end - a commitment that operates without intermediate
desire. The refugee knocks on the door and we find ourselves with the
immediate, categorical thought that we must help in some way, whether
we want to or not. In fact, such motivating commitment to an end often
operates despite our desire for conflicting ends. So it cannot be the case
that there is a purely conceptual connection between having an end and
having a desire for it.
There is, however, some empirical evidence ofa psychological connection that underwrites this line of thought about deliberation. People who
are brain-damaged (or medicated) in ways that appear to dramatically reduce or perhaps even eliminate a broad range of motivating desires have
great difficulty in making decisions - in deliberating. But notice now that
this gives us only another tight circle of argument about the good of
human emotion: human desire is good for human deliberation because
human deliberation (as a matter of human psychology) requires human
desire. So what moral shall we draw from this? Follow nature? A very Stoic
moral, and none the worse for that.
VIRTUE AND TRANQUILLITY

The question we must now consider is whether the Stoic commitment
to virtue demands a psychology that diverges significantly - especially
with respect to emotion - from one that is recognizably healthy by the
standards of modern psychology. As we have seen, it is relatively easy to
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make the case that there is a close connection between psychological
health and the development of ordinary forms of rational agency along
Stoic lines. The question that remains is about the sage, and about the
fact that Stoicism requires one to strive to become a sage.
The question is this: is training someone to be a sage rather like training someone to become a very specialized athlete, whose specialized
physique is, in the long run, quite unhealthy? (Think of a Sumo wrestler.)
Our agency powers are one element of our human endowments. What is
the cost to the rest of our human constitution of maximizing the development of agency? In particular, for present purposes, what is the cost to
our emotions and feelings and to affect generally?
The abilities of the Stoic sage are extraordinary- at the apex of human
agency. And it is not easy to describe in a positive way what those abilities would be like. The ancients were clear that while sages would have
limited knowledge and power, by virtue of being finite creatures, and
would therefore often fail in their endeavors (sometimes lethally fail),
they would not be negligent in gathering and interpreting what information was accessible to them, and they would not make mistakes - in
the sense of misinterpreting or misapplying their knowledge in humanly
avoidable ways. Moreover, sages would be able to cope with all sorts of
adversity, difficulty, suffering, and disappointment, to the utter limit of
human endurance. That kind of perfection would require sages always to
be free from psychological disturbances that would interfere with their
optimal exercise of agency, and it would require that their optimal exercise of agency never be disturbed by their own failures (because these
would not be due to avoidable errors) or by any other events beyond their
control, such as the death of a loved one, enslavement, or losses of any
kind.
What kind of psychology would such a sage have? Here it is easy to
make a serious error, and answer that, in general, sages must have virtuosic
abilities to cope with whatever befalls them. This is of course true, but only
half the truth, and operating with that half-truth produces the following
familiar but false picture of the sage:
Sages are poised - perfectly poised - to understand their circumstances and options and to move in whatever way reason dictates. They must be calm, alert, and
not committed in advance to a particular course of action that would prevent
them from responding adequately to unanticipated events. Attachments to externals - to people, relationships, wealth, health, anything not wholly within one's
control- threaten to compromise their coping ability by restricting their options
in advance, and must be modified accordingly. Passions and strong emotions
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compromise coping ability as well because they generate momentum like running full tilt downhill - and render us incapable of certain responses we might
need to make (like stopping before we get to the clift). So passions and strong
emotions must go. Similarly for any feelings and moods of a sort that disturb either perception, deliberation, or choice. What this leaves for the sage is a form of
tranquillity and detachment consistent with maximal alertness and readiness to
respond to anything that happens. It is as if we imagined the sage as a world-class
tennis player ready to receive serve - up on her toes, parallel to the baseline,
perfectly balanced for an instant move either to the right or the left, perfectly
positioned for a lunge, or a run, or a reflexive block of a shot hit directly at her
body, racquet loose in the hand, uncommitted as yet to a forehand or backhand
grip, eyes on the ball, but senses registering everything that is salient to making
an effective return of serve, and focused, calm, tranquil, detached in the sense
that she is not distracted by the crowd, her husband's infidelities, the injustice
of her pending prosecution for tax evasion, the recent death of her first child.
And, of course, we then imagine that this sort of tranquillity and detachment is
the sage's permanent (waking) psychological condition.

What is wrong with this picture is that it is constructed in terms of waiting
for things to happen - in terms of being ready to receive serve. But the
exercise of our agency is not just passive and reactive; it is also active,
intentional, inventive, provocative, determinative. We have to step up
and serve the ball and actually commit ourselves to making a particular
sort of return, as often as we wait to serve, or wait to receive serve. And
the picture of the sage in action is rather different than the picture of
the sage in waiting.
For one thing, inertia - getting going - is as big a problem for action
as getting stopped. So is commitment, and momentum. If you have to
jump from one rim of the narrow gorge to the other, you don't do it by
keeping your options open permanently. You need speed, and running
downhill (if you are lucky enough to have a hill nearby) isa good way to get
going and keep going, even if it means you reach the point of no return
sooner than you would if you tried to jump from a standing start. Focused,
energized, muscular affect (tonos) 24 of the sort American professional
football players work up before each game, and within the game before
each play, is not typically out of place either, because the momentum it
generates contributes to playing the game undercontrolat the highest level.
It is, of course, possible to have an inappropriate type or amount of such
affect, as inexperienced players often do. And some players find it hard
to confine such energy to the game - to leave it on the field, as the saying
goes - or to work it up without repeating a litany of false propositions that
no Stoic could support. But no football coach thinks that such excesses
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give him a reason to discourage players from "putting on a game face"
because it is understood that this is something that belongs only to the
game, and only when it is consistent with playing under control. The point
is simply that once we are committed to acting in a particular way, Such
focused, energized affect and momentum are sometimes appropriate.
And agents must always, ultimately, commit themselves to action.
So we must not be misled by the ancient analogy between passion and
running full tilt. This cannot mean that extreme, energized affect and
momentum are always inappropriate. Mter all, the ancient Stoics were
certainly aware of the way in which sleep, especially deep sleep, could
compromise rational agency precisely because it creates the opposite sort
of difficulty to running. In the running case, it is hard for agents to get
stopped; in the sleeping case it is hard for them to get started. I am not
aware of any ancient Stoic arguments to the effect that because of the
difficulty of getting started, sages should not sleep, or not sleep deeply.
And I am unimpressed by the comparable argument that because of the
difficulty of getting stopped, sages should not run. This makes no sense
in terms of the sage's final end - the perfection of the exercise of rational
agency. When running is appropriate, sages run. When momentum is
appropriate, sages have it.
Notice, however, that this is not an Aristotelian point about the usefulness of passion (e.g., of anger) in motivating our actions, or even in
sustaining the motivation. The ancient Stoics were right to insist that for
the sage, the knowledge that a course of action is the appropriate one
is always sufficient motivation to pursue it. The point here about momentum is rather a point about agent energy - about the physical and
psychological resources an agent has to have to pursue an endeavor that is
already motivated and already chosen. Sages who find themselves in close
combat may find that they need ferocious energy, affect, and momentum
as much as they need good blood gases - for fighting under control, to
the limit of their abilities. And once we see that the intensity of the affect
can be uncoupled from beliefs (recall that beliefs can be held with flat
affect; ferociously intense affect can be generated precognitively, in the
limbic system), we need not imagine that there is a necessary connection
between achieving or sustaining such ferocity and holding false beliefs.
It is certainly true that Stoics will reject any passions, or other intense
emotional states that involve false beliefs, and it may be true that passions
and strong emotions are usually dependent on false beliefs in some way.
But such dependence is neither a logical nor a psychological necessity.
Because Stoics are committed to the perfection of the activity of rational
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agency, they are committed to cultivating the affective states needed for
it. In the case of ferociously intense affective states, Stoics will reject those
that invoke false beliefs and find other ways to cultivate intensity when it
is needed.
The general point is that in any environment rich with possibilities,
the sage's exercise of rational agency will be exceedingly complex and
call for a comparably complex affective life. There will be extended periods of careful deliberation and reflex reactions; mundane routines and
high-stakes risk taking; strength moves; moves requiring little strength
but major amounts of fine muscle control; coping with success; coping
with unexpected good fortune; coping with failure; inventing remedies
for boredom; inventing remedies for the stress of overwork; solving conflict, coordination, and cooperation problems with benevolent people;
with malevolent people; being a friend; being a competitor; being an
adversary; being an enemy; making war; making peace; making love; on
and on and on. And all repeated in a bewildering variety of situations
calling for subtly and not so subtly different conduct. It seems highly
implausible to hold that any single, well-defined affective state (such as
tranquillity) could possibly be adequate for sages engaged in a reasonably wide range of endeavors in a reasonably rich set of circumstances.
And no matter how limited the sages' circumstances and options might
be at a given time, they must be prepared for an unexpected reversal they must be capable of handling great good fortune and an abundance
of opportunities.
Thus, whatever ground-down form of affect may be required of the
slave of a drunken despot or the prisoner in a death camp, Stoic training
must aim to produce a psychology that can also respond appropriately
to safety, security, freedom, and affluence. Stoicism is for emperors as
well as slaves, the rich and famous as well as the obscure, the strong and
beautiful as well as the weak and ugly - in the full range of situations
in which those people can find themselves. That much has never been
in doubt. We simply add here that the appropriate affective dimension
of such lives will be as varied as those people and their circumstances,
and we think that, once this point is understood, concentrating on the
perfection of agency will not move us away from psychological health.

LOVE, DETACHMENT, AND PURITY OF HEART

That leaves love. There are two problems with it. One concerns the sort of
quick release mechanism recommended by Epictetus in some notorious
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passages about replacing lost wives and children, just as one replaces
broken tea cups. Apparently the sage is supposed to be able to let go of
externals so quickly that grief or suffering from a loss is not an issue. That
persuades many people that there must be something phony about the
way a sage loves in the first place. They suspect that the only way to achieve
this sort of immediate release is to be more or less detached and unloving
from the start. And, of course, Stoic insistence that virtue, rather than any
external person or thing, is the only thing that is ultimately any good at all
contributes to the impression that Stoics would resist becoming attached
to externals - would resist, in that sense, a fundamental aspect of what
we call love.
The second problem with fitting a Stoic account of emotion into our ordinary notion oflove concerns the way in which Stoics must monitor their
emotions intellectually, making sure that they do not involve any cognitive
errors about what is ultimately valuable or about what affective responses
are appropriate - that is, are psychologically healthy and otherwise consistent with the development of virtue. The result of such monitoring is
undeniably a persistent sort of highly refined triple consciousness: firstorder awareness within the emotional state itself, second-order awareness
of being in the emotional state, and third-order awareness of the nature
and value of being in that state. A Stoic is always going to be two parts
observer and one part participant in emotional experience - something
that will not only complicate the intentionality of Stoic loving but add a
certain remoteness or distance to it as well. If purity of heart is to have
simple intentions,2 5 then it looks as though it is going to be difficult for a
Stoic to be pure-hearted in love - or wholehearted either, for that matter.
Recall the line from an exasperated E. E. Cummings: "since feeling is
first / who pays any attention / to the syntax of things / will never wholly
kiss you."26
Pure Love
Let me address this purity of heart problem first. Double consciousnessthat is, awareness and awareness of being aware - is a necessary part of the
kind of rational agency that develops in human beings as they mature. It
is in that sense part of our nature as human beings. We can, of course,
choose to regard it as a curse rather than a blessing and take steps to
eliminate the self-consciousness part, leaving only first-order awareness.
(I assume that people who valorize emotion would not want to go farther and eliminate first-order awareness.) But once we acquire language,

-----

Stoic Emotion

I
I

self-consciousness is exceedingly difficult to strip away from first-order
consciousness for more than short intervals, and it can be exceedingly
dangerous to our health to do so in unfavorable circumstances. That
suggests the importance of third-order assessments that address, among
other things, when it is appropriate to lose ourselves in our experience
and when it is not. ("Kiss me you fool." - Not now. The attic is on fire.)
And the endorsement of the importance of those assessments is not anything unique to Stoicism. It is a matter of common sense, not to mention
sound psychotherapy.
In the discussion of tranquillity I suggested that it was consistent with
the notion of Stoic sagehood to recognize that the demands of virtuosic
activity (as opposed to receptivity) sometimes include temporary, rationally controlled loss of self-consciousness. It seems reasonable to extend
that point here to include the observation that third-order monitoring
of one's emotions will thus sometimes be intermittent, controlled by sophisticated dispositions sensitive to changes in circumstance. A tennis
player who is playing "in the zone," as they say, presumably still has a dispositional readiness to respond to things that are dramatically out of the
ordinary (such as an earthquake or an attack by a spectator), as well as the
dispositional readiness to come out of the zone when the match is over.
In this respect there is little difference between Stoics and non-Stoics.
Where there is a striking difference on these matters between Stoics
and at least some non-Stoics (call them romantics) is in how willingly
they embrace the complexity of intention in actively monitored emotional states and the distancing it involves. 27 Stoics characteristically have
no regrets about this at all, when it is the appropriate thing to do, and are
unlikely to go out of their way to minimize the occasions when it is prudent to monitor their emotions. Romantics seem dismayed and regretful
about the necessity of such monitoring and are likely to make persistent
efforts to avoid it. The argument between them, however, is ~ot.proper~y
construed as one about the availability of wholehearted StOIC kisses. It IS
rather about the value of emotion itself for the good life.
Detachment
Now to the question about detachment. The first thing to point out is
that Stoics recognize what amounts to a very intimate and deep form
of attachment as a fundamental mechanism in human psychology, and
an indispensable mechanism for the development of virtue. I refer to
the ancient discussions of oikeiosis - the appropriation or incorporation
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f externals so that one's interest in their welfare ceases to be merely
~
..... ental and becomes instead like one's interest in one's own welfare.
Ins truv •
. .
That is surely the begmnmg of love: when one cares about another for
the other's sake, not one's own. And when this occurs by way of oikeiosisb way of the psychological incorporation of the beloved's interests into
y e'S own - the attachment is as strong and intimate as can be imagined.
on ones we love are 1·Itera11"
The
y parts"0f us th en, as romantics say. Such
..... ents occur in the normal course of human events, whether we
attaC h
ke further steps toward becoming Stoics or not.
ta What is distinctive about Stoic love is how Stoics define human welfare,
and consequently what our deepest cares and concerns are, both for
ourselves and for those we love (for those who have become a part of us,
s chologically). Stoics care ultimately only about virtue: excellence in
~h~ activity of rational agency. But as I have argued, that entails caring
about health - both about physical health and psychological health, including the range and depth of emotional experience necessary for it. It
also entails caring about life itself, and liberty, and having the material
resources necessary for the exercise of our agency. But we care about
those things in a subsidiary way. It would be self-defeating to be concerned
about them a way that forces us to compromise virtue. Thus death, disease,
discomfort, or even slavery is preferable to a vicious life. Because those
we love are a part of us, we love their lives, health, ease, and liberty the
way we love our own - as preferable to their opposites, certainly, but as
nothing compared to virtue.
That means that a sage will not love others in a way that diminishes her
virtue - her excellence in the exercise of her rational agency. She will not,
for example, become so attached to others that she literally cannot bear
the prospect oflosing them, any more than she would be attached to her
own life in a way that made the prospect of her own death unbearable.
Nor would she wish others to love her in that way - to be desolate and
helpless when she is gone, unable to bear the loss. What Stoics wish for
others is what we wish for ourselves: good lives; virtuous lives; including
the ability to cope with loss. And we add this thought: when a loved one
dies, it is literally not possible thereafter to care about his interests for his
own sake, because he no longer exists. We must therefore think carefully
about the cognitive content of the sorts of attachments and emotions
that survive in us after his death. Whatever they are, however appropriate
they may be as an extension of the concerns he had during his life, they
cannot be the kind of love they once were: caring for another as we care
for ourselves. When we pay attention to that, the alienating brutality of
LV
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some of the ancient texts on the subject of grief, love, and loss will be
lessened.
Is Stoic love austere? Not especially. To see this, I think it is only necessary to reflect in a commonsense way on this thought: imagine a person
who wants you to be able to say, truthfully, these sentences: "You are my
love, my life, my whole life. If I were to lose you my life would be ruined;
over." Those sentences are not about loving you for your own sake; they
are not ultimately about you at all. They are rather the declaration of
a medical emergency and a plea for help (or a threat). So what can it
mean when people say that they want you to have that kind of emotional
attachment to them? That they want you to lose your life when you lose
them? Is that compatible with loving you for your own sake? If so, then it
is that sort of love that is austere, not the Stoic sort. The only austerity
in Stoic love comes not from its lack of attachment (there is plenty of
attachment) but rather from its readiness to sacrifice everything except
virtue for love.

Notes
1. In a famous passage in Lives ofEminent Phiwsophers (7.116), quoted here from
LS 65F, Diogenes Laertius says:
(I) They [the Stoics) say that there are three good feelings: joy, watchfulness, wishing. (2) Joy, they say, is the opposite of pleasure, consisting in well-reasoned swelling
[elation); and watchfulness is the opposite offear, consisting in well-reasoned shrinking. For the wise man will not be afraid at all, but he will be watchful. (3) They say
that wishing is the opposite of appetite, consisting in well-reasoned stretching [desire).
(4) Just as certain passions fall under the primary ones, so too with the ptimary good
feelings. Under wishing: kindness, generosity, wamlth, affection. Under wdtchfulness:
respect, cleanliness. Under joy: delight, sociability, cheerfulness.
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:nd breaking off your relationship .with finality. You have a rush of sudden
feeling and emotion - a rush, beWilderment, anger, hurt. And in the next
moment, you see that your lover is reading a script - rehearsing a part in a
play that has nothing to do with you. What happens to your emotions? The
bewilderment, anger, and hurt drain away immediately, replaced by relief,
hilarity, perhaps self-mockery. What happened? What changed? Cognition
changed. Beliefs changed, and evidently drove the change in affect, including not only the conative impulse (whatever it was) but even the underlying
state of physiological arousal. And we can multiply such examples without
end. Psychotherapists quite generally go even farther than this, by acknowledging that many pathological emotional states are also transformable by
changes in the subject's beliefs. Consequently, treatment regimes for many
sorts of psychological illnesses - including depression, anxiety, phobias of
various sorts - rely heavily on what can only be called Stoic principles. (At
least one current variety of psychotherapy acknowledges this explicitly: rational emotive behavior therapy. See notes 6 and 17.) This sort of change is
commonplace, and naturally enough suggests the Stoic hypothesis - namely,
that for rational agents (e.g., humans at or above the age of reason) beliefs
underwrite the uriginal emotions in such examples as well.
16. Cooper 1999·
17. Contemporary versions of such psychotherapy are quite abundant, the most
obvious being rational emotive behavior therapy. See, for example, Ellis
1974 and Lazarus 1995. And see, for the suggestion that some forms of
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psychoanalysis
reviewofB k m'Igh t be "Stoic" in a thoroughgoing sense, D. H. Ingram's
18. Lazarus 19ec er 1998 m
. th e AmericanjournalojPsychoanalysis (Ingram 1999 ) .
19. Th
94·
e canonical St.o.IC
. remedy would be to crank up the level of one's attention
or perceptual
and there i ablhty. But there are physiological limits to sensory perception,
introspect' s no reason to believe that there are not similar limits on the
2
o. Panksepp Ion 8ofo ur mental states.

21. Cha r
199: chs. 2-4·
and KraWlec
. 1979; Flanagan 1991: ch. 15; Stocker and Hegeman
199 pm
.
6
22. Stocker and H
23. "Blowout
egeman 1996 : ch. 3·
Amy, frorr?~ur candles and make a wish. Want something. Want something."
on plays b dmpany (1970), music and lyrics by Stephen Sondheim, based
24. I thank B: eorge Furth.
to link it t ad Inwo~d and Richard Sorabji for suggesting I phrase this point
Scott A
the StOIC use of tonos. See definition II·4 in H. J. Liddell and R.
68
25. Kierkeg ~k-EnglishLeXicon, rev. H. S.Jones (Oxford: Clarendon, 19 ).
aar
26. E. E. Cu
.1993, 152-54: "Purity of Heart Is to Will One Thing."
27. Persona;nmmgs 1994: 29 1: "since feeling is first."
H. Ingra co~espondence, 16 March 1999, from the psychoanalyst Douglas
is richn m .D., on an early draft of this paper. "From my perspective ... it
flicting ess o~ emotion - including the simultaneous containment of conemoti emotIOns, layered emotions, and the ironic multiplicity of mingled
rany suons - that
.
rnakes lor
a muscular psychological health. I believe that
ing so ppresslO ? of emotion - including that suppression created by callimpovm~ hemouons 'good' and some 'bad' - leads to a narrowing, even an
ens ment o f th e capacity
. for rauonal
.
agency.»
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